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1957] RECENT CASES 243
INSURANCE - ACCIDENT INSURANCE - BENEFITS FOR DEATH WHILE COmIT-
"IING FELONY.- Plaintiff, beneficiary under an accident policy insuring against
injuries sustained solely through external, violent and accidental means,
brought suit to recover inder the policy for the death of the assured who was
hurned to death while intentionally burning a building to collect the insurance
on it. After preparations for ignition had been made, the insured had re-
entered the building with the consent of the owner, a fellow arsonist. While
in the building, the fire ignited prematurely, and he was burned to death. The
Appellate Court for the Third District of Illinois, in reversing the lower court,
held that the fire was the proximate cause of death, and since it occurred pre-
iniaturely to the time which was intended, it was an accident entitling the
beneficiary to recovery under the accident policy. Taylor v. John Hancock
Alut. Life Ins. Co., 132 N.E.2d 579 (Ill. 1956).
The general rule is that the insurer must make an exception in the policy if
it is not to cover death due to, or connected with, violation of law.' New
York has a; statute expressly requiring this exception to be included,2 while
North Dakota permits such an exception under certain conditions. 3 It has
been held that recovery must be denied because the exception clause is a
rnere statement of public policy which would control regardless of the pro-
visions of the contract.4 Recovery has also been denied where it was shown
that the violation of law was the proximate cause of the death 5 or injury,"
and the insured could reasonably expect to be injured or killed as the result
of his acts.
7
It has been held by courts allowing recovery that it is not sufficient that
.in unlawful act was committed by the insured, and death occurred during the
time he was engaged in its commission, but it must be shown that the act had
a direct connection with the death.8 Courts have defined an accident as that
which happens by chance, or which is unexpected, unusual and unforseen. 9
"i hese courts reason that the injury or death has resulted through accidental
means where, in the act which precedes the injury, something unforseen and
unexpected occurs and produces the injury or deathie Under this theory, the
insurance company is liable unless it can be shown that the insured purchased
the policy in contemplation of the commission of the felony, and the conse-
1. Domico v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 191 Minn. 215, 253 N.W. 538 (1934);
Van Riper v. Constitutional Government League, 1 Wash. 2d 635, 96 P.2d 588 (1940).
2. N. Y. Insurance Law, § 164-4-(f)-21.
3. N. D. Rev. Code § 26-03A03 (Supp. 1953) (Provides that the exception may be
included at the option of the insurance company, provided that the exact words of this
section are used; or, if not used, the consent of the Commissioner is obtained. Either
the caption of this subsection, or a similar caption approved by the Commissioner, must
precede the statement of exception in the policy).
4. Wells v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 191 Pa. 207, 43 Atil. 126 (1899);
DeMello v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 281 Mass. 190, 183 N.E. 255, 257 (1932)
(dictum); Berne v. Prudential Ins. Co., 235 Mo. 178, 129 S.W.2d 92, 98 (1939)
(dictum).
5. Winter v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.. 235 Mo. 184, 129 S.W.2d 99 (1939).
6. Hutton v. State Accident Ins. Co., 267 Ill. 267, 108 N.E. 296 (1915).
7. Udisky v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 264 App. Div. 890, 35 N.Y.S.2d 1021 (2d
Dep't. 1942).
8. Accident Ins. Co., v. Bennett, 90 Tenn. 256, 16 S.W. 723 (1891).
9. United States Mut. Ace. Ass'n v. Barry, 131 U. S. 100 (1889); Olinsky v. Railway
Mail Ass'n., 182 Cal. 669, 189 Pac. 835 (1920).
10. See e.g., Koester v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 6 W. W. Harr. 537, 179 Atl. 327
(Del. 1934).
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quent danger." The reasoning seems to be based on tMe fear of establishing
an unjustified means for evasion of liability.
12
Several courts have allowed recovery on the theory that the beneficiary
derives his rights through contract father than from the estate of the insured.
13
Courts also say that when the insured purchases his policy, the beneficiary ob-
tains a vested interest which should not later be divested or jeopardized by any
wrongful act of the insured, not excluded from the policy, for which the bene-
ficiary was not responsible, 14 unless it is positively shown that the policy was
obtained in contemplation of the crime. 15
It seems that the contractual right of the beneficiary presents the best argu-
ment in favor of recovery. The insured usually does not purchase the policy
ior his own benefit, but rather for that of a third party; and since ample con-
sideration is paid for the indemnity, the third party should not be deprived of
his rights under the contract merely because one of the original parties has
died or been injured as the result of an unlawful act. The court in the instant
case apparently avoided the necessity of adopting one of the theories set out
above by reasoning that the accident occured before the actual commission of
the felony.
JOHN M. RILEY.
NUISANCE - INJUNCTION - ENJOINING OPERATION OF USED CAR LOT.-Plain-
tiffs, home owners in a zoned residential district were granted a perpetual in-
junction prohibiting the defendants operation of a "used car lot" which was
located on an adjacent unincorporated area and separated from the zoned dis-
trict by a federal highway. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant's business
diminished the value of their property, created excessive noise and illumination,
and was unsightly. In affirming the decree of the lower court the Supreme
Court of Appeals held that the evidence was sufficient to justify a finding that
the used car lot constituted a nuisance in fact. Martin v. Williams, 93 S.E.2d
835 (W. Va. 1956).
A person may use his property as he sees fit so long as he does not -invade
the rights of others, based upon the ordinary standards of life and the concep-
tions of reasonable men.' When the use of property is unreasonable, unlawful,
or when it unwarrantably impairs the rights of another it becomes a nuisance,
2
depending upon the particular facts of each case. A common conception of a
nuisance is that it is anything which results in the disturbance or annoyance
of one in lawful use, possession, or enjoyment of his property or which renders
its ordinary use or occupation physically uncomfortable. 3 Nuisances have been
11. Domieo v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 191 Minn. 215, 253 N.W. 538 (1934);
Hcme State Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 175 Okla. 492, 53 P.2d 562 (1936).
12. Zurich Gen. Ace. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Flukinger, 33 F.2d 853 (4th Cir. 1929);
Sanders v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 104 Utah 75, 138 P.2d 239, 243 (1943) (dictum).
13. Home State Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 175 Okla. 492 53 P.2d 562 (1936); Collins
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 232 111. 37, 83 N.E. 542, 544 (1907) (dictum).
14. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Guller, 68 Ind. App. 544, 119 N.E. 173 (1918); Payne
v. Louisiana Industrial -Life Ins. Co., 33 So.2d 444 (La. 1948).
15. Home State Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 175 Okla. 492, 53 P.2d 562 (1936).
1. Wilson v. Evans Hotel Co., 188 Ga. 498, 4 S.E.2d 155 (1939).
2. Kramer v. Pittsburgh Coal Co., 341 Pa. 379, 19 A.2d 362 (1941); accord, City
cf Temple v. Mitchell, 180 S.W.2d 959, 962 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944) (the invasion must be
substantial).
3. Jones v. Trawick, 75 So.2d 785 (Fla. 1954).
